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Fehrler, Sebastian; Schneider, Maik T. - 2019

Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the … literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that … also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035706

Squid Voting Game : Rational Indecisiveness in Sequential Voting

Kamada, Yuichiro; Yasuda, Yosuke - 2022

We consider a model of common-value sequential voting in which voters are differentiated in their information. We ask whether the intuition as in the simultaneous-voting case---voters with no information would vote so as not to influence the outcome---would be valid to imply long voting in our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014239132

Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games

Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - 2009

We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202604

Matching politicians to committees

Thakur, Ashutosh - 2021

I analyze the assignment mechanisms used by the political parties in the US Senate to match their members to legislative committees from a matching theory perspective: one-sided, many-to-many matching with existing tenants. Understanding the data-generating process through detailed analysis of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012511771

Distance rationalizability of scoring rules

Can, Burak - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010385376

A lemma in open sequential voting by veto

Novikova, Natalia M.; Pospelova, Irina I. - In: Mathematical social sciences 90 (2017), pp. 141-144

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929314

Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 211-247

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the suc- cessive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704808

Sequential Majoritarian Blotto Games

Klumpp, Tilman; Konrad, Kai A. - 2018

We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113499

Sequential Majoritarian Blotto Games

Klumpp, Tilman - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917948

Strategic sequential voting

González-Díaz, Julio; Herold, Florian; Domínguez, Diego - 2016 - This version: July 27, 2016

In this paper, we study the potential implications of a novel yet natural voting system: strategic sequential voting. Each voter has one vote and can choose when to cast his vote. After each voting period, the current count of votes is publicized enabling subsequent voters to use this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514799