Economists have used the term “nonbinary” to describe both choice functional nonbinariness (choice functions that cannot be rationalized as the maximizing outcome of a binary preference relation) and structural nonbinariness (the structure of the model dictates that pairs of alternatives do...

A voting paradox arises when the outcome of a case is the opposite of the resolution of the individual issues within the case. For instance, eight Justices believe a statute is constitutional under the Due Process Clause, and five Justices believe the same statute is constitutional under the...

In some cases, appellate court panels will reach different conclusions depending upon whether they resolve the cases with a single vote - that is, using outcome-based voting - or by voting upon each issue separately - that is, using issue-based voting. Commentators lament the fact that courts...

We consider axiomatic characterization of social choice functions when there exist a fixed number of voters. Our particular interest is in social choice functions that reflect, to some extent, positional information in voters' preference rankings as well as orders between two alternatives. More...

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds...

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

We axiomatize the anti-plurality rule by anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, and new axioms, that is, averseness and bottoms-only. Averseness is a weaker axiom than faithfulness, and bottoms-only is an opposite axiom of tops-only. Thus, we do not apply the characterization of a scoring social...

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...