We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition.If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages.

We examine how a merger a .ects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the...

Employment of apprentices seems to follow the business cycle. An interesting question is whether this is based on an investment policy where firms recruit when the labour market indicates skill shortage. Alternatively it may be that the firms are myopic and basically hire apprentices in booming...

An international oligopoly model with unionised and non-unionised firms is constructed to make predictions about the pattern of international mergers.

An adverse selection model is analysed where firms can either train or hire a skilled worker. In equilibrium the market wage is determined by supply and demand.