Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints...

This study explores the relationship between the daily habits of S&P 500 CEOs and their financial remuneration. Using a mixed-method approach, the research analyzes time allocation across work, sleep, and exercise among 22 CEOs from leading publicly listed U.S. corporations. Regression analysis...

In the past two decades, increasing the influence of common shareholders has become a touchstone of good governance and shareholder democracy across the globe. Institutional activism combined with major regulatory overhauls has led shareholders to play a more active role in corporate...

We document that the cross-sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously, both at the economy level and within industry and size groups. We find evidence consistent with one explanation; reciprocal benchmarking (i.e., firms including each other in the set of peers used to...

Despite its potential role, CEO quality has been inadequately addressed in CEO compensation research. Using an Australian sample of 571 firms, this paper provides evidence that CEO quality, measured by CEO reputation and tenure, has a positive effect on firm performance, and explains...

Eighty-nine percent of S&P500 companies report benchmarking CEO pay components. Analyzing a panel of CEO compensation data entailing 1,251 S&P 1500 firms during 2007-2013, we find that: 1) total compensation benchmarking less effectively explains CEO compensation than does component-of-pay...

We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive CEO-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm...

We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak penalties for poor performance. UK...

CEOs of public (listed) firms earn more than their counterparts in similar private (unlisted) firms. This can either be because rent extraction is easier in public firms than in private firms, or because managing a public firm involves more legal and institutional responsibilities than managing...