In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market always increases welfare. If the input market is...

Previous literature has mostly considered R&D and licensing activities separately. In this paper we examine the effect of licensing on R&D and social welfare. We show that the effect of licensing on the incentive for doing R&D is ambiguous and depends on the costs of doing R&D. We also show that...

Previous literature has mostly considered R&D and licensing activities separately. In this paper we examine the effect of licensing on R&D and social welfare.We show that the effect of licensing on the incentive for doing R&D is ambiguous and depends on the costs of doing R&D. We also show that...

We show that under a fixed-fee licensing contract if the licenser and the licensee bargain over the licensing fee, licensing decreases (increases) innovation by decreasing (increasing) the strategic (non-strategic) benefit from innovation. However, licensing increases innovation under a two-part...