This paper studies the market and welfare effects of income heterogeneity in monopolistically competitive product markets in the context of nonhomothetic preferences. In a closed economy, where richer individuals' expenditures are less sensitive to price change compared to poorer ones', a...

Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) propose a general model that encompasses the model developed by Krugman and Venables (1995)-henceforth, 'CPVL model' - and the model by Ottaviano (2002) - henceforth, FEVL model. The authors demonstrate that FEVL and CPVL models exhibit the same properties when...

Recent empirical evidence suggests that prices for some goods and services are higher in larger markets. This paper provides a demand-side explanation for this phenomenon when firms can choose how much to differentiate their products in a model of monopolistic competition with horizontal product...

Recent empirical evidence suggests that prices for some goods and services are higher in larger markets. This paper provides a demand-side explanation for this phenomenon when firms can choose how much to differentiate their products in a model of monopolistic competition with horizontal product...

In the standard Krugman (1979) non-CES trade model, several asymmetric countries typically lose from increasing trade costs. However, all countries transiently benefit from such increase at the moment of closing trade, under almost-prohibitive trade costs (i.e., near autarky, which is possible...

This paper develops a general-equilibrium model which features the Home Market Effect and land use for production in the sector of increasing returns to scale. The land rent in the larger region is higher, meanwhile, the larger region holds more-than-proportionate share of firms, the so called...

I present a model of two quantity-setting firms, each producing two goods in a different country, but enjoying a competitive advantage in only one of them. An international cartel can either shut down trade and manufacture both goods domestically or foreclose the inefficient plant and import the...

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel's incentive compatibility constraint (ICC),...

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC),...

This study quantifies the uneven welfare gains from trade between firm owners and workers in a multi-country model of monopolistic competition under a demand system of constant elasticity of substitution (CES). An agent decides to start up her own firm or to be employed as a worker according to...