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This paper investigates the incentives for countries to implement and maintain the global minimum tax introduced by the G20/OECD’s Inclusive Framework 2021 agreement: Pillar 2. It argues that the agreement has sufficient elements to create incentives for large headquarters countries to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014258177
A Theory of International Taxation combines qualitative and quantitative analyses to shed light on the shaping of the international tax regime (ITR) over the last century. It offers a theory of the ITR as the product of the strategic interaction between three small groups with market power:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014353302
A Theory of International Taxation combines qualitative and quantitative analyses to shed light on the shaping of the international tax regime (ITR) over the last century. It offers a theory of the ITR as the product of the strategic interaction between three small groups: international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014240333
Over the years many proposals for global taxes – taxes levied on a world-wide basis – have been made. None has been successful, essentially because one cannot have global taxes without a global government. This paper first reviews some of the major global tax proposals and then considers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011721677
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033573
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012495931
In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892184
Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048825
Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418792