spillovers in technology agreements. We utilize the coalition-proof concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria and identify …

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We … consider three coalition games that allow for the formation of multiple coalitions. The coalition games represent different …

investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay … in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several …

international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on …. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries … of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in …