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Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements : a network formation approach

Jorzik, Nathalie; Müller-Langer, Frank - 2013

introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multi-country settings with a firm in each country that … is efficient but not necessarily the only multilaterally stable trade equilibrium when countries are symmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720329

Implications of inequality aversion for international climate policy

Vogt, Carsten; Sturm, Bodo - 2011

In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players' benefit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306006

Minimum participation rules with heterogeneous countries

Weikard, Hans-Peter; Wangler, Leo; Freytag, Andreas - 2009

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330092

The political economy of international environmental agreements: A survey

Wangler, Leo; Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos; Weikard, … - 2011

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331077

New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

Finus, Michael; Eyckmans, Johan - 2003

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325122

New roads to international environmental agreements : the case of global warming

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001843533

Implications of Inequality Aversion for International Climate Policy

Vogt, Carsten; Sturm, Bodo - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178828

International Climate Games : From Caps to Cooperation

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven - 2010

targets. To break this deadlock and shift the equilibrium toward cooperation, a modification of the public-goods game based on … rewards adoption of and compliance with such a target. The Nash equilibrium of one such game is analyzed for a group of three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044933

Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game : How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2013

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … multiple coalitions will emerge in equilibrium. Most of the regional agreements are superior to single agreements. Moreover … global optimum (full cooperation) and the Nash equilibrium(no cooperation) by a substantial amount …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051299

Game Theory for Global Climate Policy

Stoft, Steven - 2014

This paper solves the global cap-and-trade game exactly as the public-goods game is normally solved and finds a problematic outcome. Abatement of greenhouse gas emissions is a global public good, and supplying a public good is a game with strong incentives to free ride. Adding a cap-and-trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195754