Fundamentalist organizations and the terrorists they spawn do not arise of a vacuum. Combating terrorism requires understanding the principles of groups’ formation, development and growth. We use economic theory to explain the creation and development of fundamentalist groups. In this paper we...

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers? observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable...

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers' observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable...

Die Worte Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl kommen im Grundgesetz nicht vor. In ständiger Rechtsprechung betont das Bundesverfassungsgericht, dass das Grundgesetz keine Entscheidung über die deutsche Wirtschaftsverfassung getroffen hat. Gleichwohl hat das Gericht häufig über das Verhältnis von...

This paper investigates the impact of voter support on the representation of women in the political profession. The empirical analysis exploits two-stage elections in the United States and Italy to hold the selection of candidates constant. In two-stage elections, candidates are admitted to the...

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...

Die Worte Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl kommen im Grundgesetz nicht vor. In ständiger Rechtsprechung betont das Bundesverfassungsgericht, dass das Grundgesetz keine Entscheidung über die deutsche Wirtschaftsverfassung getroffen hat. Gleichwohl hat das Gericht häufig über das Verhältnis von...

We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instruments to redress the lack of...

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...