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Competing with Asking Prices
Lester, Benjamin - 2013
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087203
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Competing with Asking Prices
Lester, Benjamin - 2013
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087422
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Performance‐maximizing large contests
Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 57-88
Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants’ performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures that achieve this objective in settings with many contestants. The contestants may be ex-ante asymmetric in their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159024
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Competing with Asking Prices
Lester, Benjamin - 2016
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986936
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Competing with asking prices
Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2013
and allocations. -- asking prices ; competing mechanism design ; auctions with entry ; competitive search …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009696885
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Designing dynamic research contests
Benkert, Jean-Michel; Letina, Igor - 2016
This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research contests when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal contest and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In particular, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538596
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Competing with asking prices
Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011488000
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Competing with asking prices
Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 731-770
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705187
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Optimal Prize Design in Rank-Order Contests
Liu, Bin - 2020
In this paper, we allow budget-augmenting negative prizes in all-pay auctions with incomplete information, which in … general entail endogenous participation of contestants, and investigate effort-maximizing rank-order-based prize allocation … rule. We find that at the optimum, the adoption of negative prizes is essential and the prize allocation rule must be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838160
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Designing dynamic research contests
Benkert, Jean-Michel; Letina, Igor - 2019 - Revised version
This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012052584