The contest entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each bidder receives a signal about the value of the prize and has a signal-dependent probability of participation. All bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids. It is shown that the contest organizer...

We study the incentives of players to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a rent-seeking contest. We show that information sharing can arise in equilibrium if types are concentrated enough, whereas sharing information is strictly dominated if types are...

In classical models of markets, the state of nature is revealed regardless of the actions agents take. If instead agents can uncover information they will determine which states can be distinguished and thus which goods are traded. Competitive equilibria can then be inefficient. One source of...

We consider a large rational expectations economy built on Han and Yang (2013) where traders can share information with each other via an information network and investigate the impact of network connectedness on market equilibrium outcomes. We find that in the equilibrium with endogenous...