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Actions Speak Louder than Words : econometric evidence to target tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets
Andreoli Versbach, Patrick; Franck, Jens-Uwe - 2013
Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust enforcement which greatly depends on evidence of explicit communication. We propose to target specific elements of firms' behavior that facilitate tacit collusion by providing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009777055
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Delays in leniency application : is there really a race to the enforcer’s door?
Gärtner, Dennis; Zhou, Jun - 2012 - First version June 2012, Revised November 2012
common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685867
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Corporate social responsibility by joint agreement
Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter; Treuren, Leonard - 2021
Industry-wide voluntary agreements are touted as a means for corporations to take more corporate social responsibility (CSR). We study what type of joint CSR agreement induces firms to increase CSR efforts in a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. Consumers have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591411
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Transparency and tacit collusion in a differentiated market
Schultz, Christian - 2002
This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from underbutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409987
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R&D cooperatives and market collusion : a global dynamic approach
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian … - 2016
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520481
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Optimal destabilization of cartels
Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham - 2019
The literature on cartel stability sidelines antitrust policy, whereas the literature on antitrust policy tends to … neglect issues of cartel stability. This paper attempts to connect these two interrelated aspects in the context of an … augmented quantity leadership model. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012419
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R&D cooperatives and market collusion : a global dynamic approach
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian … - 2017
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (The American Economic Review 78(5): 1133-1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602548
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Partial cartels and mergers with heterogenous firms : experimental evidence
Gomez-Martinez, Francisco - 2017
) model where firms are heterogeneous in terms of production capacities and individual cartel decisions are endogenized. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761059
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Multimarket linkages, cartel discipline and trade costs
Agnosteva, Delina; Syropoulos, Constantinos; Yotov, Yoto V. - 2017
. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781965
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Optimal cross-licensing arrangements : collusion versus entry deterrence
Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2018
This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873750