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Gossner, Olivier (contributor); … - 2005 - 1. ed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002646465

Gossner, Olivier; Hernández, Penélope; Neyman, Abraham - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 74 (2006) 6, pp. 1603-1636

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003392320

The robustness of incomplete penal codes in repeated interactions

Gossner, Olivier - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012429908

On the complexity of coordination

Gossner, Olivier (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661494

On the complexity of coordination

Gossner, Olivier; Hernández, Penélope - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001650478

How to play with a biased coin?

Gossner, Olivier; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and economic behavior 41 (2002) 2, pp. 206-226

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001728694

Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Gossner, Olivier; Tomala, Tristan - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001791485

Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Gossner, Olivier - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 79 (2011) 5, pp. 1627-1641

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376248

Impermanent types and permanent reputations

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Gossner, Olivier; Wilson, Andrea - In: Journal of economic theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 162-178

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009548957

When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

Gossner, Olivier (contributor); … - 2006

We study the relationship between a player’s (stage game) minmax payoff and the individually rational payoff in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under a full rank assumption, we further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003781451