The paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed on the effect of their consumption than the policy-maker. When he chooses the tax, the policy-maker optimizes both the incentive effect and the effect on beliefs. We show that optimal taxes under symmetric...

Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007 JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who decide how much to...

Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007 JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who decide how much to...

In a recent article which appeared in this journal, Hoel and Saeter propose a model showing that welfare may be improved by introducing delay in public health care. In this note we argue that their model may be used as starting point because of their stringent assumptions. We suggest that the...

Since the seminal work of Oates (1972) on fiscal federalism, a central question of public finance has been which level of a federation should be assigned the provision of public goods. In this paper we study the problem of a government that is to choose the optimal...

In this paper we use a simple theoretical model to compare alternative regulation regimes for the reimbursement of medical innovations when responses to a new treatment (effectiveness) are heterogeneous within the eligible population. We study two dimensions: i) efficiency in selecting...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patients' right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...