We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to quot;excessivequot; entry, a licence fee can increase … welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity …

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of … licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by … discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result …

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the … that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry. …

Optimal entry policy is considered in markets served by both domestic and foreign firms. Compared with the prior entry … literature, introducing foreign producers as market participants reduces incentives for entry deterrence and enhances incentives … for entry subsidization. Incentives are changed because entry produces "terms of trade" gains. The optimal entry subsidy …