Similar Search Results

Committing to incentives : should the decision to sanction be revealed or hidden?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2010

Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence … confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact … in case of low performance. -- Intrinsic Motivation ; Monetary Incentives ; Job Performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944178

Competition and fatigue at work

Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2018

We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take into account fatigue, which accumulates over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976073

Grades and rank : impacts of non-financial incentives on test performance

Jalava, Nina; Joensen, Juanna Schrøter; Pellas, Elin - 2014

performance. We conduct a randomized field experiment on more than a thousand sixth graders in Swedish primary schools. Extrinsic … treatment groups. The only treatment not increasing test performance is criterion-based grading on an A-F scale, which is the … typical grading method. Test performance is significantly higher if employing rank-based grading or giving students a symbolic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398729

The Effect of Incentives of Real Effort : Evidence from the Slider Task

de Araujo, Felipe Augusto - 2015

.6 and 27.3 sliders per round, respectively. The one-slider increase in observed performance is small, not only relative to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021431

Combining "real effort" with induced effort costs : the ball-catching task

Gächter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin - 2015

We introduce the "ball-catching task", a novel computerized real effort task, which combines “real” efforts with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010528809

Combining "real effort" with induced effort costs : the ball-catching task

Gächter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin - 2015

We introduce the "ball-catching task", a novel computerized real effort task, which combines "real" efforts with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530634

Combining "real effort" with induced effort costs : the ball-catching task

Gächter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518803

Corporate social responsibility in the work place : experimental evidence on CSR from a gift-exchange game

Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - 2011

We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers' motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of profits to a charity. We are testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of profits...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230365

What drives motivated agents? : the "right" mission or sharing it with the principal

Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - 2015

Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401176

Exploring the effects of unequal and secretive pay

Fischer, Sven; Steiger, Eva-Maria - 2009

We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discriminatory pay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes low paid agents to reduce effort. We control for intentionality of wages by either allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing a random process. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003924261