Showing 1 - 10 of 17
We study the screening problem of a firm that needs to hire a worker to produce output and that observes neither the productive ability nor the intrinsic motivation of the job applicant. We completely characterize the set of optimal contracts according to whether motivation or ability is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014161327
This paper investigates the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in choosing a teaching career using data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia. We find that the opportunity costs of becoming a teacher vary by gender: women enjoy a small wage premium, whilst males...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077017
We study optimal contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive services of one worker, who is privately informed about her ability and her motivation. Firms differ both in their production technology and in the mission they pursue and a motivated worker is keen to be hired by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051225
We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and their intrinsic motivation. When workers are motivated, ine¢ ciencies due to adverse selection are mitigated and a change in salaries may have unexpected consequences. With a su¢ ciently strong and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063829
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011495179
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011986330
We study optimal non-linear contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive services of workers, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Firms differ in their organizational form, and motivated workers are keen to be hired by the non-profit firm because they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703431
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589323
We study optimal contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive services of one worker, who is privately informed about her ability and her motivation. Firms differ both in their production technology and in the mission they pursue and a motivated worker is keen to be hired by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729955
We study the screening problem of a firm that needs to hire a worker to produce output and that observes neither the productive ability nor the intrinsic motivation of the job applicant. We completely characterize the set of optimal contracts according to whether motivation or ability is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730934