Using the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock to funding costs, we show that hedge funds act as liquidity providers. Hedge funds using Lehman as prime broker could not trade after the bankruptcy, and these funds failed twice as often as otherwise-similar funds...

Using the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock to funding costs, we show that hedge funds act as liquidity providers. Hedge funds using Lehman as prime broker could not trade after the bankruptcy, and these funds failed twice as often as otherwise-similar funds...

We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some, or all, of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information we find that confidential positions earn positive and...

We undertake a comprehensive analysis of onshore and offshore hedge funds to study the effects of fund regulation and investor clienteles on a fund's share restrictions, asset liquidity, flow-performance sensitivity, and performance. Liquid asset holdings and share restrictions on investor...

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the Tech Bubble and Financial Crisis. Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and non-crisis periods. Managers of...