Although strong empirical evidence suggests that the entrepreneurs in countries with weak legal systems often engage in "tunneling" (expropriating funds that rightfully belong to minority shareholders), the same entrepreneurs may prop up firms using their private resources. Anecdotal evidence...

We study the determinants of vertical integration in a new dataset of over 750,000 firms from 93 countries. Existing evidence suggests the presence of large cross-country differences in the organization of firms, which may be related to differences in financial development, contracting costs or...

In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunnelling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model...

We document information rigidity in forecasts for real GDP growth in 46 countries over the past two decades. We investigate: (i) if rigidities are lower around turning points in the economy, such as in times of recessions and crises; (ii) if rigidities differ across countries, particularly...

Recourse to controls on capital flows among developing economies is generally quite pervasive. This paper examines the structure and determinants of capital controls based on a cross-sectional study of developing and transition economies. It identifies categories of capital transactions that can...