Incomplete information on the degree to which governments internalize the long-run interests of the state is an essential element of information asymmetry in international relations. A reputational model with such incomplete information captures two observed facts: i. costly activities, among...

In this work we present a Global Emission Game with N asymmetric players, in which the pay-off of cooperators is affected by a Social Externality, that we assume to be a positive function. We refer to the notion of self-enforcing agreements to study the stability of the coalition and we assume...

There are increasing signals that countries that negotiate on GHG emission control are unlikely to sign and ratify a single climate protocol, even though almost all countries have subscribed the UNFCCC convention that sets the framework of international climate cooperation. In addition to the US...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...

We consider a dynamic setting where two countries with competing claims to a resource/asset first arm and then choose whether to resolve their dispute through war or peacefully through settlement. War precludes international trade and can be destructive, but also locks gains and eliminates...

LLMs are emerging as information sources that influence organizational knowledge, though trust in them varies. This paper combines data from a large-scale experiment and the World Values Survey (WVS) to examine the determinants of trust in LLMs. The experiment measures trust in LLM-generated...