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Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements : a network formation approach

Jorzik, Nathalie; Müller-Langer, Frank - 2013

introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multi-country settings with a firm in each country that … is efficient but not necessarily the only multilaterally stable trade equilibrium when countries are symmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720329

New roads to international environmental agreements : the case of global warming

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001843533

Implications of Inequality Aversion for International Climate Policy

Vogt, Carsten; Sturm, Bodo - 2011

In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178828

International Climate Games : From Caps to Cooperation

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven - 2010

targets. To break this deadlock and shift the equilibrium toward cooperation, a modification of the public-goods game based on … rewards adoption of and compliance with such a target. The Nash equilibrium of one such game is analyzed for a group of three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044933

Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game : How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2013

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … multiple coalitions will emerge in equilibrium. Most of the regional agreements are superior to single agreements. Moreover … global optimum (full cooperation) and the Nash equilibrium(no cooperation) by a substantial amount …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051299

Game Theory for Global Climate Policy

Stoft, Steven - 2014

This paper solves the global cap-and-trade game exactly as the public-goods game is normally solved and finds a problematic outcome. Abatement of greenhouse gas emissions is a global public good, and supplying a public good is a game with strong incentives to free ride. Adding a cap-and-trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195754

Global Climate Policy : Why and How to Change Course

Stoft, Steven - 2012

Climate negotiations have largely failed, so a change of course is required. This requires that a sizable group of experts recommend a small, clear set of policy guideposts that lead to a more cooperative treaty. This papers proposes a set of three guideposts and derives them from an analysis of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014163253

Implications of inequality aversion for international climate policy

Vogt, Carla; Sturm, Bodo - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009244226

The political economy of international environmental agreements : a survey

Wangler, Leo; Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos; Weikard, … - 2011

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009271149

Minimum participation rules in international environmental agreements : empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations

Kesternich, Martin - 2015

Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477133