We characterize the equilibrium level of emissions, the equilibrium stock of global pollution and the discounted net social welfare for both the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria when the countries face the risk of a sudden irreversible jump in the global damages at an unknown date. The...

This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and...

Scientific evidence reveals that renewable resource stock dynamics are subject to uncertainty due to changes in environmental conditions. Despite its critical impacts on management, little is known about the effects of such uncertainty on the formation of regional fisheries management...

We characterize the equilibrium level of emissions, the equilibrium stock of global pollution and the discounted net social welfare for both the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria when the countries face the threat of a sudden irreversible jump in the global damages at an unknown date....

We examine how adaptation to climate change affects the incentives to ratify international environmental agreements (IEAs). In particular, we study the effects of two aspects on the incentives to join a coalition. First, we analyze cross-country differences in adaptation costs. Second, we...