investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay … in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several …

international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on …. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries … of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in …

international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on …. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries … of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in …

climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend … on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of … higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition. …

climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend … on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of … higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition. …

environmental agreements ; coalition formation ; transboundary pollution ; environmental policy coordination …

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … theory that in the case of greenhouse gases stable coalition structures (partial cooperation) can close the gap between the … the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We …