This paper explores the access charge for the use of the Italian rail infrastructure. Access problems arise when the provision of a complete service to end users requires the combination of two or more inputs, one of which is non-competitive (OECD, 2004). It is a well-known fact that excessive...

We consider a vertically related market characterized by downstream imperfect competition and by the monopolistic provision of an essential facility-based input, whose price is set by a social-welfare maximizing regulator. Our model shows that the regulatory knowledge about the cost for...

We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends...

We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products....

This paper explores the access charge for the use of the Italian rail infrastructure. Access problems arise when the provision of a complete service to end users requires the combination of two or more inputs, one of which is non-competitive (OECD, 2004). It is a well-known fact that excessive...

We investigate the manner in which vertical separation affects lobbying activities as well as the access charges for essential facilities. We find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and new...

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of a liberalized railway market, in which train operation and ownership of infrastructure are vertically separated. We analyze how the regulatory agency will optimally set the charges that operators have to pay to the infrastructure manager for access...

This paper explores the access charge for the use of the Italian rail infrastructure. Access problems arise when the provision of a complete service to end users requires the combination of two or more inputs, one of which is non-competitive (OECD, 2004). It is a well-known fact that excessive...

In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...