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Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard

Houben, Eike - 2002 - First Version: March 2002, this Version: December 2002

The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281511

Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard

Houben, Eike - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282329

Start-ups, venture capital financing, and tax policy under adverse selection

D'Andria, Diego - In: FinanzArchiv : European journal of public finance 74 (2018) 4, pp. 462-480

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011955556

Mitigating agency risk between investors and ventures' managers

Bellavitis, Cristiano; Kamuriwo, Dzidziso Samuel; … - In: Journal of general management 43 (2017/2018) 1, pp. 33-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011912152

A multiagent game theoretical approach to adverse selection in corporate financing : reducing asymmetric information in Mudaraba contracts by developing adverse selection indices

El Fakir, Adil; Tkiouat, Mohamed - In: Investment management and financial innovations 13 (2016) 2, pp. 292-299

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665563

Entrepreneurial experiences from venture capital funding : exploring two-sided information asymmetry

Glücksman, Sarah - In: Venture capital : an international journal of … 22 (2020) 4, pp. 331-354

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012424546

Equity crowdfunding : high-quality or low-quality entrepreneurs?

Blaseg, Daniel; Cumming, Douglas J.; Koetter, Michael - In: Entrepreneurship theory and practice : ET&P 45 (2021) 3, pp. 505-530

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012521465

Quality ambiguity and the market mechanism for credence goods

Benner, Dietrich (contributor) - 2004

With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase - ex ante - nor after purchase - ex post -. Trust has to replace own examination and verification. Applying Choquet-Expected Utility theory, a general model of credence goods is developed which takes the problem of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342061

Do Credit Constraints Matter more for College Dropout Entrepreneurs?

Werner, Arndt - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Start-ups and their respective market partners are faced with severe problems of asymmetric information due to their lack of prior production history and reputation. Given this situation, it is most likely that outside financiers will not be informed about the potential gains, losses, and risks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789869

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, H.; Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

investment is. We explain the empirically observed prevalence of debt contracts as an equilibrium phenomenon with competing … lenders. Equilibrium contracts must be immune against raisin-picking by competitors. Non-debt contracts allow competitors to … may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092395