We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants … create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries … competition. We exploit shocks to information coverage to show that lenders enter new markets after joining the bureau in a …

and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than … the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may …

equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately revealing and the incentives to acquire information are preserved …. Price-cost margins and bid shading are affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply functions are steeper … common value case they tend to the collusive level. Private information coupled with strategic behavior induces additional …

equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately revealing and the incentives to acquire information are preserved …. Price-cost margins and bid shading are affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply functions are steeper … common value case they tend to the collusive level. Private information coupled with strategic behavior induces additional …

equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately revealing and the incentives to acquire information are preserved …. Price-cost margins and bid shading are affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply functions are steeper … common value case they tend to the collusive level. Private information coupled with strategic behavior induces additional …

and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than … the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may …