Accounting for ambiguity aversion in dynamic decisions generally implies that either dynamic consistency or consequentialism must be given up. To gain insight into which of these principles better describes people's preferences we tested them using a variation of Ellsberg's three-color urn...

Ambiguity refers to a decision situation under uncertainty when there is incomplete information about the likelihood of events. Different formal models of this notion have been developed with differing implications about the representation of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.

This paper shows that, for CEU preferences, the axioms consquentialism, state independenceand conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating characterise a family of capacities,called Genralised Neo-Additive Capacities (GNAC). This family contains as special casesamong others...

We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games of incomplete information set in L. J. Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities and payoffs. Players'...

This paper studies how updating affects ambiguity-attitude. In particular we focus on the generalized Bayesian update of the Jaffray-Phillipe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity-attitude to be the same before and after updating. A necessary and...

We present a definition of increasing uncertainty, in which an elementary increase in the uncertainty of any act corresponds to the addition of an `elementary bet' that increases consumption by a fixed amount in (relatively) `good' states and decreases consumption by a fixed (and possibly...

Raiffa (1961) has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be indifferent to ex ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically-consistent ambiguity averse...

We present a formal treatment of contracting in the face of ambiguity. The central idea is that boundedly rational individuals will not always interpret the same situation in the same way. More specifically, even with well defined contracts, the precise actions to be taken by each party to the...