Showing 1 - 10 of 24
This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to information platforms. The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843294
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843365
There has been considerable debate concerning whether consumer surplus or total surplus should be the welfare standard for antitrust. This debate misses two critical issues. First, antitrust is not straightforwardly welfarist—it does not maximize but protects, and it does not forbid all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843459
We propose a simple, new test for making an initial determination of whether a proposed merger between rivals is likely to reduce competition and thus lead to higher prices. Under current antitrust policy, the government can establish a presumption that a proposed horizontal merger will harm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843464
This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to information platforms. The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538418
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010677861
This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to information platforms. The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678032
While exclusive dealing can be efficient, the Chicago School has also argued that it cannot be anticompetitive, or that it seldom is. That argument takes two forms; both are weak. First, a pricetheory argument (“the Chicago Three-Party Argument”) depends crucially on a special model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561466
Over the past forty years, there has been a remarkable transformation in horizontal merger enforcement in the United States. With no change in the underlying statute, the Clayton Act, there has been a dramatic decline in the weight given to market concentration by the federal courts and by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011131703
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843317