Appropriation possibilities significantly alter economic fundamentals in a production and exchange economy. This is the primary lesson of our model, which combines Ricardian trade and the potential for predator/prey behavior. The model shows how conflict can be subdued by mutual gains from...

We examine incentives to seize and defend goods offered for trade in an Edgeworth box economy. Appropriation possibilities generate an equilibrium of coerced redistribution and voluntary trade in a reduced box. Potential mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of piracy creates a price...

When appropriation possibilities are overlooked, the predictions of standard trade models can be misleading. Trade theorists need a new class of models designed to investigate the effects of appropriation possibilities on exchange. Toward this end we incorporate appropriation possibilities into...

We derive the payoffs of a hawk-dove game based upon production, exchange, and appropriation possibilities. We then link the evolutionary equilibrium of the game to economy-wide fundamentals: production, volume of trade, security of property, welfare, and the extent of hawks in the economy....

Although conflict economics has expanded its interest post-Cold War violence, our theme is that conflict potential weaves itself into the decision of consumers, producers, and traders in ways that economists have essentially ignored. This is the lesson of our literature review and of our model,...

Grossman and Kim's (1996) predator-prey model predicts as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium level of appropriation will vary from zero to full to partial predation. We test the prediction using a repeated single-play protocol with eight decision periods. The...