Procurement auctions often involve quality considerations as a determinant of the final outcome. When qualities are the procurer’s private information then various information policies may be used to affect the expected outcome. For auctions with two cost heterogeneous suppliers, this work...

We study a model of procurement auctions in which information policies can be used to treat two heterogeneous suppliers asymmetrically. The buyer is shown to be better off revealing information about her preferences to the weak supplier only, when there is a sufficient cost difference between...

This work studies a model of multidimensional auction in which a buyer needs to procure a given good from either of two potential suppliers whose quality is the buyer's private information and whose production costs are heterogeneous. Costs asymmetries constitute a novelty in this framework and...

This work studies a model of multidimensional auction in which a buyer needs to procure a given good from either of two potential suppliers whose quality is the buyer's private information and whose production costs are heterogeneous. Costs asymmetries constitute a novelty in this framework and...