Showing 1 - 10 of 34
On the example of a pure-exchange financial economy with two periods, incomplete nominal asset markets and differential information of the adverse selection's type, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (2002) introduced refined concepts of price, arbitrage and a so-called «no-arbitrage equilibrium», which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005220169
In a general equilibrium model of incomplete markets with nominal assets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (3) introduced refined concepts of " no-arbitrage " prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information. We now present the model with numeraire assets and study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005220197
On the example of a pure-exchange financial economy with two periods, incomplete nominal-asset markets and differential information of the adverse selection's type, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (2002) introduced refined concepts of no-arbitrage prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670920
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012667148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012667151
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012667156
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015357382
In [2], we had extended the classical concepts and arbitrage theory of symmetric information, to an asymmetric information model, which dropped Radner's (1979) rational expectations' assumption. In [3], we showed how agents could infer enough information, in this model, to rule out arbitrage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262819
Our earlier papers had extend to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common observation suggests,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738445
Our earlier papers had extended to asymmetric information some classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew at the outset which price would prevail tomorrow on each spot market. Yet, observation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738450