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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350
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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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A model of Charles Ponzi
Barlevy, Gadi; Xavier, Inês - 2025
-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015332994
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985504
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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers: Theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint E.; Karapandza, Rasa; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504361
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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers: Theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint E.; Karapandza, Rasa; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507306
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580425