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better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational … of insider information the call auction performs worse than continuous double auction. Testing these hypotheses in the … lab we find that insider information increases informational efficiency of call auction prices but does not decrease the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012437539
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477420
For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490631
transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014283608
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014322519
I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340964
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467862
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274941