Similar Search Results

Coalition formation among farsighted agents

HERINGS, Jean - Jacques; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642218

Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 286-298

of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682977

Coalition formation among farsighted agents

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; … - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 286-298

the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751968

Structural stability of coalitions: A formal model highlighting the role of participants positioned between members and neutral actors

Monsuur, Herman; Janssen, René - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12

Given a fixed network that links various actors, we introduce a formal model that describes the structural stability of … formulated three assumptions that may be used to characterize the stability of this partition. We paid particular attention to …) illustrate the verification of the stability of a coalition, (2) provide existence results of stable coalitions, and (3) set the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200173

Coalition formation under power relations

Razin, Ronny; Piccione, Michele - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 1, pp. 1-15

We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599413

Enemies and Friends in Hedonic Games : Individual Deviations, Stability and Manipulation

Dimitrov, D.A.; Sung, S.C. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations are allowed.For two natural subdomains of separable preferences, namely preference domains based on (1) aversion to enemies and (2) appreciation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092320

COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

BENCHEKROUN, HASSAN; LONG, NGO VAN - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 14 (2012) 04, pp. 1240002-1

the various concepts of coalitional stability, such as internal and external stability and far-sighted stability in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883245

Coalition formation under power relations

Razin, Ronny; Piccione, Michele - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812745

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184889

Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership

LE BRETON, Michel; MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D.; SAVVATEEV, … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836134