We analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different...

We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result,...

Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied...

International environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons. Important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits, and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of...

This paper deals with a a cooperative game theoretic analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change. To cope with the question of the voluntary implementation of the international optimum, a financial transfer scheme is proposed under which no countries nor subgroup...

Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied...

<span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: ";Times New Roman";,";serif";; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: SK; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;">We deal with a strictly coalition-proof Markov perfect equilibrium in an infinite horizon oligopoly with discounting of profits, a discrete set of feasible capacity vectors, and investments into capacities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>The definition of a Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium developed by Bernheim,...</span>

In economics and other social sciences, complex processes are often represented by numerical models of reality which more or less well reflect behavioral relationships and interactions. Such attempts are the subject of a lecture course 'Mathematical Theory of Democracy' by the author at the...

In economics and other social sciences, complex processes are often represented by numerical models of reality which more or less well reflect behavioral relationships and interactions. Such attempts are the subject of a lecture course 'Mathematical Theory of Democracy' by the author at the...