hard evidence. Moreover, we examine firms' incentives to report or not to report the hard evidence to the antitrust …

awards achieves broadly the same effects as does tacit collusion. …

international – antitrust policy; however, the formal proof that a cartel really functioned economically and did not only exist in a …, focusing on legal proof of a cartel is fruitless unless collusion resulted in excess profits or excess revenues. This economic … in spring 2003, the German Antitrust Agency (GAA) fined the German cement industry – € 661 million for having established …

international – antitrust policy; however, the formal proof that a cartel really functioned economically and did not only exist in a …, focusing on legal proof of a cartel is fruitless unless collusion resulted in excess profits or excess revenues. This economic … in spring 2003, the German Antitrust Agency (GAA) fined the German cement industry – € 661 million for having established …

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …

associated theory of collusion in markets with public demand fluctuations; mixed-strategy equilibria and purification theory and … the associated theory of sales; and repeated games with imperfect monitoring and the associated theory of collusion and …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in …

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …