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Sun, Junze; Schram, Arthur; Sloof, Randolph - 2019

We develop a tractable theory to study the impact of biased media on election outcomes, voter turnout and welfare. News released by media allows voters to infer the relative appeal of the two candidates, and the closeness of elections. In large elections, the former determines the election...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030647

Transaction cost politics, institutions for commitment and rent seeking

Murshed, S. Mansoob - 2001

In developing countries, particularly in those countries that have experienced declining growth rates, institutional failure (bad policies) is closely related to development failure and growth collapses. This paper addresses the issues of commitment, compromise and rent seeking, all of which are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279342

Reputation and foreclosure with vertical integration : experimental evidence

Möllers, Claudia - 2016

Building on the seminal paper of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), I study the role of reputation building on … foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing … their price history to the current upstream competitor. In particular, integrated firms can establish a reputation to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555141

Persuasion and dynamic communication

Sher, Itai - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 99-136

A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684961

Addressing the Food Aid Curse

Blouin, Max; Pallage, Stéphane - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2007

In this paper, we build a model of agrarian economies in which a kleptocratic government taxes farmers to maximize its life-time utility. The model is a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the subsistence of farmers requires a minimum level of consumption. We analyze the effect that a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015294

Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs

Baake, Pio; Kamecke, Ulrich; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2001

In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In contrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the non-integrated downstream firm receives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260776

Contract design with limited commitment

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946258

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment

Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083306

Efficient Cheap Talk in Directed Search: On the Non-essentiality of Commitment in Market Games

Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Directed search models are market games in which each firm announces a wage commitment to attract a worker. Miscoordination among workers generates search frictions, yet in equilibrium more productive firms post more attractive wage commitments to fill their vacancies faster, which yields...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083578

Selloffs, Bailouts, and Feedback: Can Asset Markets Inform Policy

Boleslavsky, Raphael; Kelly, David L; Taylor, Curtis R - Department of Economics, School of Business - 2013

We present a model in which a policymaker observes trade in a financial asset before deciding whether to intervene in the economy, for example by offering a bailout or monetary stimulus. Because an intervention erodes the value of private information, informed investors are reluctant to take...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823155