requires a commitment for a period of uncertain duration, restricting the firm in subsequent periods. Capacity constraints … create a “fear of commitment” — some positive return projects are not adopted. In the sequential move dynamic game, the … informed. We study the e§ects of competition on the fear of commitment, and compare the jointly optimal adoption decision to …

requires a commitment for a period of uncertain duration, restricting the firm in subsequent periods. Capacity constraints … create a “fear of commitment” — some positive return projects are not adopted. In the sequential move dynamic game, the … informed. We study the e§ects of competition on the fear of commitment, and compare the jointly optimal adoption decision to …

We examine the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable. We consider a … renegotiation prevents a full elination of the commitment effect of delegation. Indeed, there are always gains from delegation when … the players are sufficiently patient. An extension to search market environment shows that the gains from delegation are …

This paper examines the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot … delegation contract. In this model, the time cost of renegotiation prevents a full elimination of the commitment effect of … basic model to a search market shows that the gains from delegation are negatively related to the efficiency of search. …