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We consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims in the context of a variable population. A property of rules is "lifted" if whenever a rule satisfies it in the two-claimant case, and the rule is bilaterally consistent, it satisfies it for any number of claimants. We identify a number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503960
domination under preference replacement), and population (population monotonicity, consistency, converse consistency). We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025187
we focus upon are the elimination of the Condorcet loser as well as several consistency-type criteria. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698636
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011537669
A group of agents have claims on a resource, but there is not enough of the resource to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? We survey the recent game theoretic approaches that have been followed in solving such "claims problems".
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883246
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126732
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010011
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526720
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383887
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann–Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744146