I study a dynamic principal agent model in which the effort cost of the agent is unknown to the principal. The principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high...

We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that...

We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off; between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that...

This paper presents an analysis of the implications it has on standard growth models assume an alternative hypothesis to the exponential growth of the population and how modeling time can alter the dynamic behavior of these models. An extension (in continuous time and discrete time) of the...

Equilibrium paths in economies of overlapping generations depend on the frequency of trade. In a logarithmic example, determinacy obtains as the frequency of trades tends to infinity or trade occurs in continuous time. If time extends infinitely into the infinite past as well as into the...

Properties of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models can be revealed by either using numerical solutions or qualitative analysis. Very precise and intuition-building results are obtained by working with models which provide closed-form solutions. Closed-form solutions are known for a...

This dissertation consists of three chapters relating to identification and inference in dynamic microeconometric models including dynamic discrete games with many players, dynamic games with discrete and continuous choices, and semiparametric binary choice and duration panel data...