Showing 1 - 4 of 4
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information. The framework explicitly accounts for the parties’ individual trade actions. The sets of implementable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011130685
This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated intomechanismdesign analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536459
This paper reports the analysis of a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaining solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536484
This paper presents analysis of contractual settings with complete but unverifiable information and where trade consists of a sequence of verifiable productive actions, between which renegotiation can occur. The main result identifies an equivalent, simplified model that can be used to calculate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536493