Contracts may be subject to strategic default, particularly if public enforcement institutions are weak. In a lab experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may...

Through contract farming schemes between cohorts of farmers and private companies the Indonesian government intended to spur rural economic development. In particular within the oil palm sector, such community-company 'partnerships' are commonplace. Yet, empirical evidence of the success of...

In the last decades global food value chains have seen the need for increasing vertical coordination in order to secure quality standards. A prominent way to govern the relationships between farmers and agri-business firms are farming contracts. We study the role of trust, risk and time...

Although there is a lot of evidence for the positive welfare effects of contract farming, it is not clear how to integrate farmers into contracts and how to maintain stable long-term-relationships between farmers and agri-business firms. While Contract Farming is a formal institutional...

Contracts may be subject to strategic default, particularly if public enforcement institutions are weak. In a lab experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may...

Through contract farming schemes between cohorts of farmers and private companies the Indonesian government intended to spur rural economic development. In particular within the oil palm sector, such community-company 'partnerships' are commonplace. Yet, empirical evidence of the success of...

In the last decades global food value chains have seen the need for increasing vertical coordination in order to secure quality standards. A prominent way to govern the relationships between farmers and agri-business firms are farming contracts. We study the role of trust, risk and time...

Contracts may be subject to strategic default, particularly if public enforcement institutions are weak. In a lab experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may...