This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We consider the weighted adaptation of the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989). The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian...

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1, ...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1, ..., xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1, ..., pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is...

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of...

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing...

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable –though perhaps different– commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two...

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of...