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Deception and Self-Deception
Schwardman, Peter; van der Weele, Joël - 2016
We experimentally investigate the determinants of overconfidence and test the hypothesis, advanced by Robert Trivers …, that overconfidence serves to more effectively persuade or deceive others. After performing a cognitively challenging task …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451529
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Deception and self-deception
Schwardmann, Peter; van der Weele, Joël J. - 2017
Why are people so often overconfident? We conduct an experiment to test the hypothesis that people become overconfident to more effectively persuade or deceive others. After performing a cognitively challenging task, half of our subjects are informed that they can earn money by convincing others...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663455
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Deception and self-deception
Schwardman, Peter; Weele, Joël J. van der - 2016
We experimentally investigate the determinants of overconfidence and test the hypothesis, advanced by Robert Trivers …, that overconfidence serves to more effectively persuade or deceive others. After performing a cognitively challenging task …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441641
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Deception and self-deception
Schwardmann, Peter; Weele, Joël J. van der - 2017
Why are people so often overconfident? We conduct an experiment to test the hypothesis that people become overconfident to more effectively persuade or deceive others. After performing a cognitively challenging task, half of our subjects are informed that they can earn money by convincing others...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626574
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Concern for Relative Standing and Deception
Galanis, Spyros; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2014
We report results from a sender-receiver deception game, which tests whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. The sender ranks six possible outcomes, each specifying a payoff for him and the receiver. A message is then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010409384
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Concern for Relative Standing and Deception
Galanis, Spyros; Vlassopoulos, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
We report results from a sender-receiver deception game, which tests whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. The sender ranks six possible outcomes, each specifying a payoff for him and the receiver. A message is then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959592
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Concern for relative standing and deception
Galanis, Spyros; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2014
We report results from a sender-receiver deception game, which tests whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. The sender ranks six possible outcomes, each specifying a payoff for him and the receiver. A message is then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404042
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Communication-enhancing vagueness
Wood, Daniel H. - In: Games 13 (2022) 4, pp. 1-27
I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367782
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Anxiety, overconfidence, and excessive risk taking
Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Schmalz, Martin C. - 2015
We provide a preference-based rationale for endogenous overconfidence. Horizon-dependent risk aversion, combined with a … possibility to forget, can generate overconfidence and excessive risk taking in equilibrium. An "anxiety prone" agent, who is more … results to the literature on empirically observed overconfidence and excessive risk taking in several domains of financial and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011341006
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Anxiety, overconfidence, and excessive risk taking
Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Schmalz, Martin C. - Federal Reserve Bank of New York - 2015
We provide a preference-based rationale for endogenous overconfidence. Horizon-dependent risk aversion, combined with a … possibility to forget, can generate overconfidence and excessive risk taking in equilibrium. An “anxiety prone” agent, who is more … results to the literature on empirically observed overconfidence and excessive risk taking in several domains of financial and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170309