In the framework of expected utility theory, risk attitudes are entirely capturedby the curvature of the utility function. In cumulative prospect theory (CPT) riskattitudes have an additional dimension: the weighting of probabilities. With thismodication, one question arises naturally: since...

In this paper we experimentally test skewness seeking at the individuallevel. Several prospects that can be ordered with respect to the third-degreestochastic dominance (3SD) criterion are ranked by the participants of theexperiment. We find that the skewness of a distribution has a...

Economics and management science share the tradition of ordering risk aversionby fitting the best expected utility (EU) model with a certain utility function to in-dividual data, and then using the utility curvature for each individual as the soleindex of risk attitude. (Cumulative) Prospect...

A cyclical network of indirect reciprocity is derived organizing 3- or6-person groups into rings of social interaction where the first individualcan help the second, the second the third, and so on till the last, who inreturn can help the first. Mutual cooperation is triggered by assuming...

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...

Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing mo-tivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. “Over-stylizing” neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates...

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games.Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the conceptof satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includesit as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic...

Charness et al. (2007b) have shown that group membership has a strong effect on individualdecisions in strategic games when group membership is salient through payoff commonality.In this comment I show that their findings also apply to non-strategic decisions, even when nooutgroup exists, and I...

On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price,specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, andform their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. Weformally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality...

Similar to welfare economics where with(out) interpersonal comparisonsone defines unique (set-valued) welfare (Pareto) optima, we present a frameworkfor one-person decision making where with(out) a prior probability distributionindividual optimality prescribes usually a unique (set of)...