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This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to study how merger emedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765658
This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead to a lower welfare. For this we study how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers, and determine the optimal frequency of...
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This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviours. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' avoidance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385271
This paper analyzes the determinants of public law enforcement policies when citizens vote for the timing and level of fi…nes. We consider situations where citizens and politicians disagree on the value of the expected social harm associated with some activities. We fi…nd that citizens vote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086650
In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779319
This paper revisits the issue of law enforcement and the design of monetary sanctions when the public law enforcer's incentives depart from those of a benevolent authority, which is the most frequent assumption made in the literature on crime deterrence. We …rst consider the case of an elected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010992370