One year after the publication of Arrow's 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values, Guilbaud (1912-2006) published in Économie Appliquée a 50 page's paper entitled Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique de l'agrégation. In this paper -unfortunately too little...

Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders where Condorcet's effect can never occur. Works of Abello, Chameni-Nembua, Fishburn and Galambos and Reiner have allowed a strong understanding of a significant class of Condorcet domains which are distributive lattices -in fact covering distributive...

In this paper we describe some research directions in social choice and aggregation theory led at the “Centre de Mathématique Sociale“ since the fifties. We begin by presenting some institutional aspects concerning this EHESS center. Then we sketch a thematic history by considering the...

Among the many significant contributions that Fishburn made to social choice theory some have focused on what he has called "acyclic sets", i.e. the sets of linear orders where majority rule applies without the "Condorcet effect" (majority relation never has cycles). The search for large domains...

Among the many significant contributions of Fishburn to social choice theory some have borne on what he has called «acyclic sets», i.e. these sets of linear orders where majority rule applies without «Condorcet effect» (majority relation never has cycles). Search for large such domains is a...

Among the many significant contributions of Fishburn to social choice theory some have borne on what he has called “acyclic sets”, i.e. these sets of linear orders where majority rule applies without “Condorcet effect” (majority relation never has cycles). Search for large such domains...

Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders where Condorcet's effect can never occur. Works of Abello, Chameni-Nembua, Fishburn and Galambos and Reiner have allowed a strong understanding of a significant class of Condorcet domains which are distributive lattices -in fact covering distributive...

We consider TU-games with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. In such a situation, the core may be unbounded, and one has to select a bounded part of the core as a solution concept. The...