We numerically solve the classical "Game of Pure Strategy" using linear programming. We notice an intricate even-odd behaviour in the results of our computations that seems to encourage odd or maximal bids.

Rufus P. Isaacs joined the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, in 1948 and started to develop the theory of dynamic games in the early 1950s. Until winter 1954/55 - when Isaacs left the RAND Corporation - he investigated two player, zero-sum dynamic games of the classic pursuit-evasion...

Are the serves of the world’s best tennis pros consistent with the theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies? We analyze their serve direction choices (to the receiver’s left, right or body) with data from an online database called the Match Charting Project. Using a...

Segmentation is a core strategy in modern marketing, and age-specific segmentation based on the age of the consumers is very common in practice. Age-specific segmentation enables the change of the segments composition during time and can be studied only by means of dynamic advertising models....

The Dynamic Programming approach for a family of optimal investment models with vintage capital is here developed. The problem falls into the class of infinite horizon optimal control problems of PDE's with age structure that have been studied in various papers (see e.g. [11, 12], [30, 32])...

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...

In this paper we analyze a stochastic continuous time model in finite horizon in which agents discount the instantaneous utility function and the final function at constant but different instantaneous discount rates of time preference. Within this context we can model problems in which, when the...

In this paper we study the problem of long-term capacity adequacy in electricity markets. We implement a dynamic model in which operators compete for investment and electricity production under imperfect Cournot competition. The main aim of this work is to compare three investment incentive...

This paper creates a mathematical model in which the banks are faced with two optimization problems. The first optimization problem is how to optimize their behavior in order to maximize profits. The second optimization is how to optimize the structure of liabilities in order to have minimum...