This Paper studies the design of education policies in a setting of successive generations with heterogeneous individuals (high and low earning ability). Parents’ investment in education is motivated by warm-glow altruism and determines the probability that a child has high ability. Education...

A link between social insurance and education policy is explored. Due to moral hazard full insurance against disability is not feasible. When high- and low-risk individuals can be identified second-best social insurance system entails cross-subsidies from the low-risk group to the high-risk...

It is well known that, in OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria will in general fail to achieve optimality and may even be dynamically inefficient. This is a consequence of individuals accumulating amounts of physical capital that differ from the level...

Despite using a variety of models and assumptions, the existing literature has overwhelmingly concluded that education policy should be regressive. In this paper, we examine a two-period model in which the government may impose non- linear taxes on both labour income and education expenditures....

In this paper we explore the consequences for optimality of a social planner adopting two different welfare criteria. The framework of analysis is an OLG model with physical and human capital. We first show that, when the SWF is a discounted sum of individual utilities defined over consumption...

This paper analyzes regional public education policy in the presence of mobile workers. Labor market integration leads to fiscal competition, shifting the whole burden of taxation to immobile workers. In the case of mobile skilled workers, this results in income inequalities and inefficient low...

Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus fünf unabhängigen Forschungspapieren über optimale Steuer- und Bildungspolitik, welche ich während meines Promotionsstudiums an der Universität Konstanz erstellt habe. Private Versicherungen gegen Einkommensrisiko können aufgrund von moral hazard...